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Abstract
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the eﬀect of ICT investment on the propensity
to oﬀshore for a large sample of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. Contrary to previous literature fo-
cussing on the service sector, after taking into account the endogeneity of ICT investment in the
oﬀshoring decision equation we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of ICT on the propensity to
oﬀshore some stages of the production process. Furthermore this eﬀect turns out not to depend
on the type of ICT investment and applies both to hardware and software/telecommunication
expenditures. A potential explanation for our ﬁnding is that ICT investments in manufactur-
ing increase the complementarity of production processes within the ﬁrm, thereby reducing the
incentive to oﬀshore. Our results seem therefore to suggest that negative exogenous shocks
to ICT prices–possibly induced by targeted policy programs aimed at the diﬀusion of ICT
technologies–do not favor oﬀshoring of manufacturing activities.
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11 Introduction
As noted, among others, by Amiti and Wei (2005) and Mankiw and Swagel (2006) the growth in
oﬀshoring activities in recent years has raised a lot of public concern in all advanced economies. In
particular, a commonly perceived worry is that workers in previously sheltered service sectors of
the economy will be more likely in the near future to suﬀer from competitive pressure from trade
made possible by improved information and communication technologies (ICT thereafter). It is
therefore hardly surprising (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)) that both the academic and the
media attention has progressively shifted towards the oﬀshoring of a variety of services ranging from
reading x-rays to developing softwares and from preparing tax forms to answering customer service
calls.
Within this general framework a very recent empirical literature has started (Abramovsky and
Griﬃth (2006), Bartel et al. (2005)) to provide econometric estimates of the eﬀect of ICT investment
on the outsourcing and oﬀshoring of business services. Broadly speaking–but not without some
cautionary remarks–the empirical evidence available so far conﬁrms a positive causal link between
ICT and the oﬀshoring of business services. To the extent that the latter negatively aﬀects labour
market outcomes in advanced economies, ICT investment itself could be blamed for such undesirable
results and, therefore, policy makers should take this unintended transmission mechanism into
account when designing public policies aimed at the diﬀusion of ICT technologies.
It must be noted, however, that the scant international descriptive evidence points out that
in many industrialized countries most of oﬀshoring activities occurs in manufacturing and not in
services. For instance, according to a very recent survey carried out by Eurostat for 13 EU countries
over the 2001-06 period, 21.7% of manufacturing ﬁrms are found to oﬀshore part of their production
activity, whereas the percentage decreases to 9.9% in service industries. As for Italy, this diﬀerence
2is even more striking, the percentages being, respectively, 15.5 and 3.0%.1 Furthermore, it has been
documented (Amiti and Wei (2005)) that UK manufacturing ﬁrms import a much larger proportion
of material than of services inputs. In short, the available empirical evidence points out that most
oﬀshoring activities refer to the purchase of material inputs by manufacturing ﬁrms.
On theoretical ground there is no compelling reason why ICT investment in manufacturing
should necessarily increase the propensity to oﬀshore. This will crucially depend on the nature of the
ICT investment. On the one hand, the reduction in communication and coordination costs is likely
to favor oﬀshoring. On the other hand, ICT also aﬀects the composition of labor demand. Available
empirical evidence (see Autor et al. (2003)) indeed suggests that ICT capital complements workers
in performing non-routine problem solving and complex communication tasks but substitutes for
workers in performing routine cognitive and manual tasks. ICT investment might therefore be
associated with a downward shift in the labor demand for workers specialized in performing routine
tasks and, ultimately, with a lower propensity to oﬀshore to countries where the supply of such
workers is high.
Our paper contributes to shed light on this issue by advancing the existing empirical literature on
the eﬀects of ICT on oﬀshoring on several grounds. Firstly, we focus on manufacturing as opposed
to business services. Secondly, as suggested by Bloom et al. (2008), we do not treat ICT investment
as an homogenous capital good and therefore do not impose the unrealistic assumption common to
most existing literature that all ICT components (i.e. hardware, software, and telecommunication)
have the same eﬀect on the propensity to oﬀshore. Thirdly, we address the endogeneity problem
of the ICT investment decision by specifying and estimating a non-linear equation system where
1This survey is part of the “Structural Business Statistics on International Sourcing” pro-
gram recently launched by Eurostat. This new program reﬂects the growing concern of pol-
icy makers at national and EU level on the likely job losses due to oﬀshoring, and the ensu-
ing need for harmonised data on the phenomenon. Further details on the survey can be found at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_business/special_topics/international_sourcing
3identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of interest is obtained by relying both on functional form and on exclusion
restrictions. This in turn allows us to test the validity of our exclusion restrictions.
What we ﬁnd in this paper is that, after taking the endogeneity of the oﬀshoring decision into
account, the investment in ICT activities has a negative eﬀect on the propensity to oﬀshore in a large
sample of Italian small-medium size manufacturing ﬁrms. Perhaps unexpectedly, this turns out to
be the case both for the hardware and for the software/communication components. Furthermore,
our ﬁndings are found to be robust to diﬀerent criteria used for the construction of the relevant
sample of ﬁrms as well as to alternative speciﬁcations of the econometric model and to the inclusion
of several ﬁrm level variables as additional regressors. Potential explanations for our results are
the increased complementarity of production stages within the ﬁrm or the augmented complexity
of tasks induced by ICT investment. Both factors are likely to reduce the incentive to oﬀshore as
opposed to in-house production. Taken at their face value, our overall results imply therefore that–
at least in manufacturing–public incentives to ICT investment are unlikely to promote oﬀshoring
and therefore this transmission channel should not be a reason of concern for policy makers when
designing public policies aimed at the diﬀusion of ICT technologies.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section motivates our paper by
reviewing the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence on the relationship between ICT
investment and oﬀshoring. In section 3 we introduce our dataset and comment upon some rele-
vant descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical model and discusses its identiﬁcation
assumptions. In Section 5 our main results are presented whereas section 6 concludes. An appen-
dix reporting the relevant questions included in the Unicredit-Capitalia survey and describing the
sample used in this paper is also included.
42 The Link between ICT Investment and Oﬀshoring
ICT investments, as well as the organizational changes they induce, are thought to aﬀect diﬀerent
aspects of ﬁrms’ decision-making and production activity through several–not mutually exclusive–
channels.2 According to common wisdom, a higher level of information and telecommunication
capital stock is perceived to stimulate oﬀshoring through a direct eﬀect, induced by enhancements
in communications abilities, and an indirect eﬀect via increased ﬁrms’ performances. It is a widely
accepted fact that the introduction of new communication technologies ampliﬁes the information
ﬂows received and sent by the ﬁrm. This phenomenon should lead to higher fragmentation of
production processes, irrespectively of whether the transfer of authority occurs within or outside
ﬁrms’ boundaries (i.e. oﬀshoring or outsourcing). On the one hand, a higher eﬃciency in monitoring
information (Colombo and Delmastro (2004)) and controlling choices at all stages of the production
process may induce a more frequent delegation of authority and decentralization of decision-making
not only within the ﬁrm but also among diﬀerent ﬁrms. On the other hand, ICT enhances ﬁrm
ability to react to external information, to absorb new technologies and to considerably improve
the quality of communication with external agents. As Grossman and Helpman (2002) show, the
reduction of informational costs may lead to an increase in oﬀshoring/outsourcing by improving
the ability and chances of ﬁnding new suppliers.
The assumption that ICT facilitates the transfer of knowledge outside ﬁrm boundaries is however
subject to several qualiﬁcations. As Leamer and Storper (2001) and Leamer (2007) emphasize, the
transfer of competencies critically depends on the important distinction between routine codiﬁable
tasks and non-routine tasks. The completion of the former relies on a type of information that can
2In the review of the literature we will not make an explicit distinction–unless explicitely stated–between oﬀ-
shoring and outsourcing since most of the transmission channels identiﬁed in the literature apply to both phenomena.
Note, however, that their policy implications diﬀer substantially, at least from a national perspective.
5be easily conveyed to an external agent. As in the case of standardized services, cognitive routine
tasks may be easily transferred to other ﬁrms, virtually with zero transportation costs, and this is
more proﬁtable when the supplier enjoys economies of scale. On the other hand, non-routine tasks
are more based on experience or are heavily dependent on creative skills. Some of these tasks are
complementary to production stages performed within the ﬁrm and cannot be relocated away from
ﬁrms’ core activities. In this case, tacit–as opposed to codiﬁable–knowledge plays a predominant
role in production decisions, and the experience embodied in these speciﬁc tasks can not be easily
conveyed within a buyer-seller relationship. Furthermore, as pointed out by Keller and Yeaple
(2008), the cost of technological transfer increases with the technological content of the task to be
oﬀshored, and the likely impact of ICT is to increase this content, thereby reducing the incentive
to oﬀshore.
The decision to oﬀshore (outsource) could not be optimal choice also when, as pointed out
by Baccara (2007) and Hempell and Zwick (2008), the externalization of production processes is
associated with an unwelcome transfer of internal knowledge outside ﬁrm boundaries. This infor-
mation leakage phenomenon might be especially harmful for highly specialized ﬁrms characterized
by complex production processes and a high degree of labor specialization. It might indeed be ar-
gued that some of the components of ICT capital (e.g. production and management softwares) are
characterized by high degrees of complexity and asset speciﬁcity and this in turn might make the
oﬀshoring of parts of the production process a less attractive option. Indeed, Hempell and Zwick
(2008) provide convincing empirical evidence that whereas ICT capital improves organizational
ﬂexibility and employee participation in decision making, its impact on the probability to outsource
and on the shares of intermediaries purchased appears to be far less strong. Moreover, according
to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) a high buyer’s asset speciﬁcity might lead to expropriation
6by the supplier, in turn leading to an incentive to internalize the production and not to oﬀshore
(or outsource). This is exactly the evidence provided by Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2008) which
use several measures of buyers’ investment intensity as proxies for asset speciﬁcity.3 An additional
direct channel through which ICT aﬀects the incentive to oﬀshore is the increase in complementar-
ity across diﬀerent production processes within the ﬁrm. This eﬀect is likely to be more relevant in
manufacturing, and could induce ﬁrms to perform in-house tasks otherwise purchased through the
market.
As already mentioned above, an indirect eﬀect of ICT on oﬀshoring can be implicitly derived
by jointly considering the two separate strands of existing literature which analyze the relationship
between ICT investment and productivity on the one hand (for a recent review see Draca et al.
(2006)), and between productivity and the international fragmentation of production on the other
hand (Antràs and Helpman (2004)). The common framework in the ﬁrst strand of literature is that
ICT technologies may improve the ﬂows of information within ﬁrms, reduce the distance between
hierarchical levels and create opportunities for team-working and joint-decision making. As a con-
sequence, the adoption of ICT, when accompanied by workplace reorganization and introduction
of new human resources practices, may substantially increase ﬁrm productivity (Black and Lynch
(2004), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000)). Since recent theoretical models on international fragmen-
tation (Antràs and Helpman (2004)) have shown that high productivity ﬁrms are more likely to
oﬀshore both components and services because they can spread the additional sunk costs from
operating abroad on a larger amount of production, ICT investments may also indirectly aﬀect
oﬀshoring decisions through productivity. Obviously, this second channel predicts a positive link
3A related strand of literature (Mol (2005), Magnani (2006)) investigates the eﬀect of technological intensity at
the industry level on the propensity to oﬀshore (outsource). The evidence is mixed, but points towards a positive
incentive of R&D on oﬀshoring activities.
7between ICT investment and oﬀshoring.
The eﬀect of ICT on productivity does not uniquely depend on improvements on information
ﬂows and allocations of tasks. As thoroughly discussed in Autor et al. (2003), ICT investment is
expected to reshape the task composition of the work force and ultimately the structure of labor
demand, by fostering automatization and mechanization of production processes. In particular,
the complementarity (substitutability) between ICT capital and workers performing non-routine
(routine) tasks increases the marginal productivity of non-routine inputs and therefore their relative
demand. This in turn might make less attractive the standard oﬀshoring option whenever this choice
is driven by the abundance of routine-workers in less developed countries. This channel predicts
therefore a negative relationship between ICT investment and the propensity to oﬀshore.
Given this multiplicity of channels through which ICT capital can aﬀect ﬁrms’ oﬀshoring de-
cisions, it becomes ultimately an empirical issue to asses their relative importance. Although
this issue has recently become harshly debated, existing econometric evidence is–to the best of our
knowledge–conﬁned to two recent papers: Abramovsky and Griﬃth (2006) and Bartel et al. (2005),
both focussing on the outsourcing and oﬀshoring of business services. In particular, Abramovsky
and Griﬃth build on the idea that ICT investment helps to reduce transaction costs and show
that ICT investment makes the acquisition of services from other ﬁrms (i.e. outsourcing) or the
localization of production stages out of the national boundaries (i.e. oﬀshoring) more convenient
than in-house production. The authors implement an IV strategy to account for endogeneity in
ICT adoption by future outsourcers and provide cross sectional evidence of the positive eﬀect of
ICT investments and internet usage on the probability to outsource and oﬀshore services for a large
sample of manufacturing ﬁrms. Interestingly for the purpose of this paper, Bartel et al. provide a
theoretical model where ICT innovation increases the compatibility between ﬁrm own technologies
8and the technology embedded in the services and products oﬀered by other ﬁrms. ICT thus lowers
ﬁrms adjustment costs and induces a higher level of outsourcing. The authors also analyze cross
sectional data at the industry level and show a positive relationship of ICT with the amount of
services outsourced in communication, accounting, advertising, software, and legal assistance. How-
ever, a negative eﬀect of ICT on the outsourcing of production related tasks including machine and
building repairing is recorded. The authors motivate this negative eﬀect with the low ICT content
of these activities and the negligible role of ICT in reducing adjustment costs.
Summarizing, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that ICT capital may have an
impact on ﬁrms’ oﬀshoring decisions. However, our summary of existing literature suggests that an
unambiguous prediction on the sign and the magnitude of this eﬀect cannot be made. It becomes
ultimately an empirical issue to assess the relevance of alternative transmission channels and indeed
this is what we contribute to in the remaining of this paper.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The variables we use are mainly retrieved from the 9th survey “Indagine sulle Imprese Manifat-
turiere”, a survey run by Unicredit-Capitalia (one of the largest Italian banks) covering the 2001-
2003 period. This survey contains information on several quantitative and qualitative variables for
more than 4,000 ﬁrms as well as their balance sheet data. The sample contains all Italian manufac-
turing ﬁrms with more than 500 employees whereas ﬁrms with less than 500 employees are selected
on the basis of a stratiﬁed sample, so that small and medium sized ﬁrms are well represented.4
Very importantly for the purposes of the paper, several survey questions refer to ﬁrms’ ICT in-
4See the Data Appendix for more details on the structure of the survey, sample selection, questions, and variables
deﬁnition.
9vestments and oﬀshoring activity. Firms are asked to report the amount they invested in ICT over
the three-year period, alongside with the breakdown by type (hardware, software, and telecommuni-
cation) and area of application (administration, production, commercial activity, internet, and other
applications).5 Furthermore, ﬁrms also report their oﬀshoring activity, i.e. whether they produce
abroad part of their production previously performed in-house.6
The survey also provides very detailed information on ﬁrms’ location at the municipal level.
Given the likely importance of the local environment in shaping ICT and oﬀshoring decisions,
we merged the survey with data on geographic and demographic municipal characteristics, such
as population, area, altitude, and geographical coordinates. Given our research strategy, we also
collected–at the municipality level–information on the availability of Broad Band (BB, henceforth)
infrastructures.7
Standard trimming procedures and exclusion of ﬁrms without information on the relevant vari-
ables reduced the original sample to the set of 3,205 ﬁrms we use in this paper.
– INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE –
– INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE –
5Unfortunately, data availability problems prevent us to compute the stock of ICT capital. For a limited number
of ﬁrms we can however observe ICT investment also in the 1998-2000 period. For those ﬁrms, the correlation
coeﬃcient between ICT intensities in the two periods is equal to 0.29. This in turn suggests that our three-year
ICT investment intensity is a suﬃciently persistent variable and therefore can be legitimately used as proxy for ICT
capital.
6The survey also elicits information on the size (as a percentage of turnover), the motivation, and the country of
destination of international production activities. 39% of oﬀshoring ﬁrms state that oﬀshored production accounts for
less than 10% of sales, 43% that it accounts for between 10 and 50%, and 18% that it accounts for over half of sales.
The most frequent cited motivation for delocalisation is "lower labour cost" (73%), whereas a much less important
factor is the reduction in "foreign market penetration costs" (7%). Finally, the oﬀshored production mostly occurs
in Romania and China, and virtually all countries mentioned in the survey as oﬀshoring destinations are at much
lower levels of economic development than Italy.
7Municipalities are the ﬁnest administrative unit in Italy. Our dataset provides information for all 8,106
municipalities.
10Tables 1 and 2 report some descriptive statistics for the two crucial variables of our analysis:
ICT investments and oﬀshoring activity. Inspection of Table 1, where the statistics are presented
separately by industry (at 2 digit level), reveals that the bulk of oﬀshoring activities takes place in
a limited number of traditional industries (textiles, clothing, leather). Notice also that oﬀshoring
activities are almost non-existent in a number of industries. For this reason we present our econo-
metric results (see below) both for the full sample and for the sub-sample of industries where we
observe non-trivial fragmentability in the data. Operationally we remove those ﬁrms operating in
industries where the share of oﬀshoring ﬁrms is below 4%. As expected, more ICT investment
takes place in high-tech industries. Some of these industries also show moderate oﬀshoring and–
overall–high(low) ICT investment industries tend to present also high(low) percentage of oﬀshoring
activity.
Additional information on total ICT investment by type and area of application is reported in
Table 2. As for the extensive margin, almost 78% of ﬁrms has invested in ICT in the three year
period and the amount invested represent a fairly sizeable percentage of ﬁrm turnover (0.3% for
the whole sample, 0.4% for the sample of investing ﬁrms). Interesting insights also emerge from
the breakdown of ICT investment by type. Most of the investment, in terms of both the number of
investing ﬁrms and the amount spent, refers to hardware or software, whereas a much less important
role is played by the introduction of TLC devices. As for the area of application, production and
administration/management are the areas mostly targeted by ICT investments, whereas commercial
activities and internet are found to be far less important. Overall, ICT expenditures in our sample
seem to be mostly concentrated in administration/management and production and involve the
introduction of new hardware or software. Far more limited is instead the role played by those
activities (communication, internet, and trade) which are commonly thought as being conducive to
11oﬀshoring.
The unconditional correlation between oﬀshoring and ICT detected by inspecting Table 1 calls
for a deeper analysis. In fact, it might be driven by ﬁrm-level observable variables aﬀecting both
oﬀshoring and ICT. To this end, Table 3 presents standard descriptive statistics for a number
of additional ﬁrm-level variables highlighted by previous literature as important drivers of ICT
adoption and oﬀshoring activity: age, size (number of employees), and ISO 2002 certiﬁcation. The
vast majority of ﬁrms in the sample are relatively “old”, as only 25% of them have been established
less than 15 years before the ﬁrst year of the survey. Note also that the median size is 49.33
employees. This provides an additional rationale–on top of the standard EU classiﬁcation scheme
for small ﬁrms–to use a size dummy for ﬁrms above or below the 50 employees threshold. Finally,
55% of the sampled ﬁrms have declared to comply with the ISO 2002 requirements. We interpret
this variable as a proxy for observed quality. In fact, a common ﬁnding of previous literature
is that ICT is mostly eﬀective when it is associated with an high quality workforce and with an
appropriate internal organizational structure. Following the existing empirical literature we use the
compliance with the ISO 2002 standards as a general proxy for quality.8 The rationale here is that
the ISO 2002 label is given only to those ﬁrms which have implemented the required organizational
changes in terms of standardization and codiﬁcation of most of the activities performed within ﬁrm
boundaries.
A ﬁrst answer to the crucial question of whether the unconditional positive correlation between
ICT investments and oﬀshoring activity we found in our data is robust to the introduction of
ﬁrm-level variables and dummies capturing local (at regional or provincial level) and industry
characteristics is provided in Table 4, where we report the results of several probit estimates of the
8See, for instance, Verhoogen (2008).
12relationship between ICT and oﬀshoring conditionally on these additional variables.
– INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE –
– INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE –
We ﬁrst control only for industry (2 digit) and regional eﬀects (column (i)). Similarly to the scant
previous empirical literature on this issue, the relationship between ICT and oﬀshoring is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The marginal eﬀect (0.008) implies that increasing the investment
intensity from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution (from 0.020 to 0.314%) increases
the oﬀshoring probability of 0.2 base points. Although this eﬀect might appear small at ﬁrst glance,
its real magnitude must be assessed by considering the low proportion (7.6%) of oﬀshoring ﬁrms
in the sample. Notice that industry dummies are very signiﬁcant whereas regional ones are not.
The positive correlation between ICT and oﬀshoring is almost unaﬀected by the replacement of
regional with provincial dummies (column (ii)) which prove to be jointly marginally signiﬁcant.
In column (iii), we include in the speciﬁcation the additional ﬁrm-level variables presented above.
As expected, size and observed quality are positively associated to the probability of oﬀshoring,
whereas age is also positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional statistical levels.
More importantly for the purpose of this paper, the coeﬃcient for ICT–although smaller in size
than in columns (i) and (ii)–is still positive and signiﬁcant. Finally, in the last two columns we
focus separately on hardware and software/TLC expenditures.9 Similar results emerge in terms of
coeﬃcients (both are positive) and estimated marginal eﬀects (which turn out to be very similar:
9Given the low share of ﬁrms which have declared to have invested in TLC activities and the limited amount
invested by these ﬁrms we only report the results for aggregated software and TLC investment in Table 4.
130.009 for software/TLC and 0.008 for hardware). However, only the one for software is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
Obviously, a causal interpretation of this set of results requires that ICT is exogenous in the
oﬀshoring equation, i.e. uncorrelated with shocks aﬀecting oﬀshoring. We believe this assumption
is very unlikely to hold since one can well think of severable unobservable or imperfectly measured
ﬁrm level variables–including managerial quality and technological/market opportunities–that
aﬀect both decisions.
4 Empirical Strategy
The econometric results presented in the last section support the widespread idea that ICT invest-
ment is positively associated to oﬀshoring. However, as previously noted, we are interested in the
causal eﬀect of ICT on oﬀshoring. This in turn implies that the issue of the likely endogeneity of
ICT must be tackled in a convincing way. We therefore specify and estimate a recursive non-linear
two-equation system for oﬀshoring and ICT investment. Given the nature of our observables it is
convenient to make the joint normal distribution for the two error terms. Within this estimation
framework the oﬀshoring and the ICT investment equations can be respectively interpreted as stan-
dard probit (equation 1) and Tobit type I (equation 2) models.10 More speciﬁcally, we specify our
10In section 5.2 we relax the Tobit type I assumption for ICT investment by estimating separately the parameters













































where subscripts i, j, m, r respectively refer to ﬁrm, industry, municipality, and region. Therefore,
xi and wm are vectors of ﬁrm- and municipal-level exogenous variables which enter both equations.
cj(fj) and dr(gr) are industry and regional dummies which control for unobservable eﬀects common
within a region and an industry respectively. zm is a vector of exogenous variables which enter the
ICT equation but can be reasonably excluded from the oﬀshoring equation. In this framework,
endogeneity of the ICT variable stems from the non-zero correlation coeﬃcient between the errors
of the two equations, ρε,η.
We estimate our model by maximum likelihood (ML). As opposed to (two step) control function
methods, joint estimation by ML is more demanding in terms of assumptions (as it requires the full
speciﬁcation of the distributions), but oﬀers the advantage of being more eﬃcient than two-step
type estimators if the distributional assumptions are correct.
Irrespective of the estimation method, the issue of identiﬁcation of the model is crucial. The
two equation system above is identiﬁed even with γ = 0 due to the non-linear functional form.11
11On the general conditions for identiﬁcation in parametric models see Bekker and Wansbeek (2001). Note also
15However, the availability of legitimate exclusion restrictions is likely to be useful since it increases
the precision of the estimates in ﬁnite samples (see, for instance, Keane (1992)). Needless to say,
however, ﬁnding such variables is–as usual in cross-sectional data–a very diﬃcult task.
One potential candidate for this diﬃcult role is the Broad Band provision at the local level. At
the time of the survey (still nowadays, actually) the provision of BB connection was very heteroge-
neous across Italian municipalities as it requires the availability of both optical ﬁber infrastructures
and Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers (DSLAM) network devices.12
– INSERT GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE –
Graph 1 plots the availability of BB across Italian municipalities at the end of our sample
period.13 It also displays regional borders. The heterogeneity between served (dark shaded) and
non-served (light shaded) municipalities is striking not only at regional but even at a much ﬁner
geographical level. Even within much narrow geographical entities as provinces (whose borders are
not shown for clarity sake) municipalities do diﬀer in the availability of BB connections.
The availability of BB is expected to increase the productivity of ICT investments, since it
reduces its cost per unit of information ﬂow. Therefore, it enters the ICT equation. At the same
time it can be reasonably assumed–and in our framework tested–not to aﬀect oﬀshoring decisions
directly. Furthermore, this variable can be safely assumed to be exogenous in the ICT equation,
although Graph 1 shows that the BB variable is not randomly distributed across municipalities.
What we argue here is that most of the non-random component of this observed heterogeneity can be
that the argument put forward by Wilde (2000) to verify identiﬁcation in the context of a bivariate probit model
also applies to our case of a Tobit-probit model.
12On the diﬀusion of BB provision in Italy see Ciapanna and Sabbatini (2008).
13Information on BB provision at the beginning of our sample period would have obviously been preferable.
Unfortunately, the ﬁrst available data collected with a consistent methodology over the whole country refer to
December 2003.
16accounted for by observable socio-geographical characteristics (density, latitude, longitude, altitude,
proximity to the sea) which capture the diﬀerences in installation cost among municipalities. Indeed,
Table 5 shows that BB provision is more likely in areas with a high population density as well as
in coastal area but less likely in mountain areas. This in turn can be explained by the fact that
most of the optical ﬁbre infrastructures run parallel to main existing railways or electroduct lines.14
Once we control for these factors we can reasonably defend the assumption that BB provision is
uncorrelated with common shocks aﬀecting ﬁrms’ ICT investment decisions within a municipality.
As a matter of fact, since not only ICT expenditures but also the oﬀshoring decision might be
driven by these geographical factors we include them in both equations.
– INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE –
5 Econometric Results
5.1 Basic Estimates
In this section we present our econometric results for the full sample of ﬁrms (Tables 6 and 7). In
each table we report three sets of regressions which refer respectively to total ICT (columns (i)
and (ii)), hardware (columns (iii) and (iv)) and software/TLC (columns (v) and (vi)) investments.
Following a sort of general-to-speciﬁc approach the equation estimates reported in Table 7 omit
those municipal-level variables which have turned out to be insigniﬁcant in the equations of the
more general systems reported in Table 6. Marginal eﬀects for all probit models for oﬀshoring are
14See Ciapanna and Sabbatini (2008).
17summarized in Table 8.15 Since results reported in the two tables are very similar we focus here
mostly on the unrestricted estimates of Table 6.16
– INSERT TABLES 6, 7, AND 8 ABOUT HERE –
In the speciﬁcation where total ICT investment enters the two equations (columns (i) and
(ii) of Table 6), results for the Tobit model are similar to those found by previous literature17:
age, size, and observed quality (ISO 2002 compliance) positively aﬀect the amount spent in ICT.
Among municipal-level variables, the only signiﬁcant variable is the dummy for ﬁrms located in
large municipalities (those with a population above 4,000 inhabitants), whose sign is negative.18 At
ﬁrst sight this result might sound a little bit counterintuitive. One, admittingly ad hoc, potential
explanation is that ﬁrms located in small towns might ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to externalize ICT
intensive activities due to the lack of partners located nearby and therefore are left with the only
option to develop them in house. A complementary explanation might also be that these ﬁrms have
to invest more in ICT to be able to connect to more distant suppliers or customers. Finally, as
expected, the BB provision variable turns out to positively aﬀect ICT adoption and to be marginally
signiﬁcant.19
15Estimation of the system has been carried out in Stata with the cmp command available at
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456882.html. As standard errors for the marginal eﬀects are not provided
by Stata mfx command, we computed them by bootstrapping.
16In principle we would have liked to estimate additional models with regional dummies being replaced by provincial
dummies. Unfortunately convergence was never reached in all our experiments.
17The literature on ICT determinants is very large. Evidence on Italy includes Bugamelli and Pagano (2004),
Lucchetti and Sterlacchini (2004), Fabiani et al. (2005), and Giunta and Trivieri (2007).
18At ﬁrst sight the fact that most municipal-level variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero might seem
to contraddict the empirical evidence reported in Table 5. Note however that in Tables 6 and 7 we also control for
regional speciﬁc eﬀects which pick up most of the variability in municipal characteristics that we observe in the data.
19Since the exclusion of the BB variable from the primary equation is not necessary for identiﬁcation we can
test the validity of this exclusion restriction by testing the signiﬁcance of this variable when included in the probit
equation. The null hypothesis of no direct impact of BB on oﬀshoring is never rejected in all estimated models.
18As for the oﬀshoring equation, size and observed quality are the most signiﬁcant variables.
Both positively aﬀect the probability of oﬀshoring. Instead, municipal-level variables turn out to
be insigniﬁcant. Very interestingly, the coeﬃcient of ICT investment is now negative and very
signiﬁcant. This result must be read jointly with the very high and positive value (0.71) of the
correlation coeﬃcient between the two errors. This shows that the positive coeﬃcients we found
in Table 4 have to be explained by the positive correlation of the ICT variable with the error
term, which biases the estimate upward. To assess the quantitative impact of the ICT variable,
we repeated the experiment we performed in Table 4. By increasing the value of ICT from the
25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution the probability of oﬀshoring decreases of 3.6 base
points. In order to assess–as before–the magnitude of the impact we have to compare it with the
percentage of oﬀshoring ﬁrms in the sample (7.6%). This leads to the conclusion that the reduction
in probability turns out to be quite large (almost 50%). Very similar results–both in terms of sign
and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients–are obtained by dropping the insigniﬁcant variables (Table 7).
Additional insights can be gained by looking at the last four columns of the two tables where
the two equation system is estimated by replacing total ICT investment with hardware (columns
(iii) and (iv)) and software/TLC (columns (v) and (vi)) expenditures respectively. As to the
Tobit equations two additional ﬁndings stand out. Firstly, the dummy for ﬁrms located in large
municipalities is negative and signiﬁcant only in the Tobit equation for software/TLC investment
(column (vi)). This result is consistent with our previous explanation based on the lack of partners
located nearby in small municipalities which is far more likely to apply to the software as opposed
to the hardware component. Secondly, and much more importantly for the purpose of this paper,
the BB provision variable also enters positively and signiﬁcantly only in the Tobit equation for
software/TLC investment. This ﬁnding suggests that TLC infrastructures are complement only to
19ﬁrms’ software/TLC investment and the likely candidate to explain this fact is that BB provision
has a productivity enhancing eﬀect only for this type of ICT investment. Finally, in the oﬀshoring
equations, both types of ICT investment enters with a negative sign (columns (iii) and (v)). By
increasing the value of the relevant ICT investment from the 25th to the 75th percentile of its
distribution the probability of oﬀshoring decreases of 1.7 base points for the hardware and of 1.3
base points for the software/TLC component. This ﬁnding therefore suggests that the negative eﬀect
of ICT investment on oﬀshoring is general and it is not speciﬁcally related to a speciﬁc investment
type, at least as captured by the hardware versus software/TLC dichotomy. Once again, very
similar conclusions can be drawn by focussing on Table 7 where all non-signiﬁcant municipal level
variables have been omitted.20
5.2 Robustness Checks
In this section we comment upon additional estimation results which provide evidence on the ro-
bustness of our main ﬁndings with respect to several departures from our baseline speciﬁcation.
Firstly, it might be argued that there are some industries where the fragmentation of production
is simply not a feasible option because of technological reasons. Therefore, we expect a null re-
lationship between oﬀshoring and ICT for these industries so that inclusion of ﬁrms operating in
these industries in the estimation sample could bias the results. To address this legitimate concern
we have rerun all reported equations only on the sub-sample of ﬁrms operating in industries with
non-negligeable oﬀshoring activities. To save on space, in Table 9 we report only the results for two
20We also estimated separate equations for software and TLC activities. In both cases the coeﬃcients on ICT are
negative and similar in size. However the estimated eﬀect turns out to be signiﬁcant only in the equation for software
investment. The fact that we do not ﬁnd a positive sign in the TLC investment equation is somehow puzzling since it
is exactly for this type of investment that comunication-coordination enhancing theories should apply. One potential
explanation can be found in the limited amount invested in TLC activities by our sample ﬁrms. On this issue see
also footnote 6.
20parsimonious speciﬁcations, respectively for the hardware and the software/TLC component. As
it can be easily seen, all our previous results are virtually unaltered with respect both to the sign
and to the signiﬁcance level of all estimated parameters.
– INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE –
Secondly, it is well known that the Tobit type I model imposes strict–and sometimes implausible–
restrictions on the relationship between the marginal eﬀects for the two relevant economic dimen-
sions of a variable characterized by a mixed distribution, namely the extensive and the intensive
margin. In our setting, this set of restrictions can be in principle easily relaxed by estimating a
three equation non-linear system composed by two probit equations modelling the binary decisions
whether to invest or not in ICT and whether to oﬀshore or not part of the production process
and by one linear equation modelling the amount of ICT investment conditional on non-zero ICT
expenditures. Diﬀerently from the ﬁrst two, this third equation can obviously be only estimated
on the sub-sample of ICT investing ﬁrms. Estimates of two parsimonious speciﬁcations are re-
ported in Table 10, respectively for the hardware and the software/TLC component of total ICT
expenditures. Before commenting upon the results, however, two cautionary remarks are necessary.
Firstly, in order to achieve convergence we had to set the value of the correlation coeﬃcient between
the error in the probit equation for the ICT binary decision and the error in the linear model for
the amount of ICT investment. Operationally, in all reported equations we have constrained this
parameter to be equal to the correlation coeﬃcient estimated from a standard Tobit type II model
for ICT investment.21 Secondly, the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects in the Tobit type II components
21All Tobit type II models have been estimated with “full” maximum likelihood. Interestingly, estimated correlation
coeﬃcients are all very close to zero, thus suggesting that the errors in the two equations are not correlated.
21of the system is based exclusively on the standard functional form assumption since ﬁnding rea-
sonable exclusion restrictions simply proved to be an impossible task. Rather comfortingly most
of our crucial results hold. In particular the eﬀect of ICT investment on the oﬀshoring decisions is
found to be negative, and signiﬁcantly so, both for the hardware (column (i)) and for the software
component (column (iv)). By increasing the value of the relevant ICT investment from the 25th to
the 75th percentile of its distribution the probability of oﬀshoring decreases of 2 base points for the
hardware and of 2.4 base points for the software/TLC component, the latter being substantially
higher than the corresponding ﬁgure we obtained with the Tobit I model. Furthermore, the BB
provision variable is found to have no eﬀect at conventional statistical levels both on the decision to
invest (column (ii)) and on the amount spent on hardware (column (iii)). As to software/TLC the
eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant on the intensive margin (column (v)) but it does not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer from 0 on the extensive margin (column (vi)).
– INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE –
Finally, it might be argued that there are other relevant ﬁrm-level determinants of the oﬀshoring
decision that we omit from our model. To address this issue we have re-estimated all our equations
by adding a battery of additional ﬁrm level variables including R&D intensity, the skill composi-
tion of the labor force, business group and district membership, and the nationality of the ultimate
owner. Both R&D and skill intensity enter with a positive sign and are signiﬁcant in some speci-
ﬁcations at conventional statistical levels. Note, however, that these variables–and skill intensity
in particular–are likely to be endogenous in the oﬀshoring equation so that a causal interpretation
cannot be given to these ﬁndings. All other controls turn out not to be signiﬁcant, with the excep-
tion of the business group membership dummy which is positively signed and signiﬁcant in some
22speciﬁcations. More importantly for our purposes, however, our crucial result of a negative and
signiﬁcant impact of ICT on oﬀshoring is virtually unaltered by the inclusion of these additional
variables.22
6 Conclusions
Available descriptive evidence suggests that the delocalization of manufacturing activities is still
quantitatively much more important than the oﬀshoring of business or personal services. This seems
to be the case in all advanced countries, but especially so in non-English speaking developed coun-
tries where the delocalization of routine services is hampered by language barriers. Furthermore, it
seems that the ICT budget of manufacturing ﬁrms is mostly allocated to investment in software and
hardware and not to investment in TLC. Only around 30% of our sample of Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms declare to have invested in TLC activities over a three-year period and, conditional on a total
positive spending in ICT, the average share of TLC investment on total ICT investment is slightly
less than one tenth.
Taken together, these two facts point out to the importance of investigating the role played
by ICT investment on oﬀshoring in the manufacturing sector. This is exactly what we have done
in this paper. Our ﬁndings are striking: once we control for the endogeneity of ICT investment
we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect which is both statistically signiﬁcant and economically sizeable. On the
aggregate the estimated marginal eﬀect is equal to −0.137 in our preferred speciﬁcation. This
implies that moving from the ﬁrst to the third quartile of the ICT distribution implies a reduction
22We have also re-estimated all our models using linear and non-linear Two-Stage Least Squares (ivprobit Stata
command). Note that these alternative estimators are not only less eﬃcient than ML but also not fully appropriate
since the former neglects the non-linear nature in both equations and the latter does not take into account the mixed
discrete-continuous nature of ICT investment. Still, they are simple to implement and provide intuitive results. All
our qualitative results–notably the negative sign for ICT in the oﬀshoring equation–are conﬁrmed but, as expected,
the eﬀect of ICT on oﬀshoring is less precisely estimated. All these results are available upon request.
23of the probability of oﬀshoring of almost 50%. Furthermore, this negative relationship does not
depend on the type of ITC expenditures but, for instance, equally applies both to hardware and to
software/TLC investment.
ICT investments should therefore not be blamed by policy makers and trade unions for spurring
oﬀshoring in the manufacturing sector. What emerges quite clearly from this paper is that an ex-
ogenous reduction in the cost of ICT investment is unlikely to spur oﬀshoring. Indeed, what we ﬁnd
is quite the opposite. One potential reason for this ﬁnding is that most ICT activities carried out
within manufacturing ﬁrms do not serve the main purpose of enhancing those factors highlighted
by the recent literature which underline the role of ICT as a monitoring and communication en-
hancing device. Our results are instead consistent with the idea that ICT investment increases the
complementarity of production stages within the ﬁrm or the complexity of tasks, thereby reducing
the incentive to oﬀshore as opposed to in-house production. Clearly, more work is needed in this
area. In particular, it would be very interesting and challenging to open the black box and quantify
more precisely the relative importance of alternative transmission channels. Even if at present data
requirements prevent us to do so it ranks high in our future research agenda.
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277 Data Appendix
The original dataset is composed of 4,289 ﬁrms. We remove ﬁrms operating in non-manufacturing
industries or with missing industry codes, so that we are left with 4,110 ﬁrms. Subsequently we
remove ﬁrms with missing (596 ﬁrms) or non-coherent information (297 ﬁrms) on ICT investment
or with missing information on oﬀshoring activities (12). This gives us our ﬁnal sample of 3,205
ﬁrms.
The BB provision data have been retrieved from the “Osservatorio banda larga”(Between), a
private company appointed by the Italian government to monitor the digital divide in Italy.
Municipal-level characteristics are obtained from a database put together by the consulting
company Metropolis from Istat sources.
7.1 Survey questions
The 9th wave of the Unicredit-Capitalia survey contains information on ICT expenditures, delocal-
ization of production, and ISO_2002 compliance. The questions we use are listed below.




C1.3.2 Which is the amount of this investment in the three-year period 2001-2003? (Euro)




C1.3.4 Indicate the speciﬁc percentage for each type of these applications (Total 100%)
1. Administrative/management systems
2. Production systems
3. Commercial systems (included customer databases)
4. Internet (websites, intranet, extranet)
5. Other applications
D3.1 At present the ﬁrm performs abroad part of its production previously performed in-house?
E.6 Is the ﬁrm awarded ISO 9000 certiﬁcation?
287.2 Variables deﬁnition
Size: number of employees averaged over the 2001-03 period.
Size dummy: dummy equal to 1 if Size≥ 50, 0 otherwise.
Observed quality: dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has been awarded the ISO 9000 quality certiﬁcate,
0 otherwise.
Age: measured as 2003 minus the establishment year.
Total ICT: 2001-03 total ICT investment scaled by ﬁrm turnover. This deﬁnition equally applies
to all ICT components (hardware, software/TLC)
Oﬀshoring: dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has declared to perform abroad part of his activities, 0
otherwise.
Broad Band provision: dummy equal to 1 if the proportion of broad band coverage in the
municipality in December 2003 exceeds 50%, 0 otherwise.
Inhabitants: number of people resident in the municipality in 2003.
Density: number of people resident in the municipality per Kms.
Latitude and Longitude: municipality latitude and longitude converted to the decimal system
Altitude: municipality altitude in meters.
Costal Area: dummy equal to 1 if the municipality is along the coastline, 0 otherwise.
Industry dummies: 21 industry dummies have been included in all the equations (15 — food
and beverages; 17 — textiles; 18 — clothing; 19 — leather; 20 — wood; 21 — paper products; 22 —
printing and publishing; 23 — oil reﬁning; 24 — chemicals; 25 — rubber and plastics; 26 — non-metal
minerals; 27 — metals; 28 — metal products; 29 — non-electric machinery; 30 — oﬃce equipment and
computers; 31 — electric machinery; 32 — electronic material, measuring and communication tools,
TV and Radio; 33 — medical apparels and instruments; 34 — vehicles; 35 — other transportation; 36
— furniture). Each dummy equals 1 if ﬁrm’s main activity is in that industry and 0 otherwise.
Regional dummies: 20 dummies corresponding to Italian administrative regions.
Provincial dummies: 95 dummies corresponding to Italian administrative provinces.








Full sample 3,205 7.36 0.308 0.121
Food, Bever. and Tobacco 371 0.54 0.170 0.066
Textiles 240 13.33 0.255 0.116
Clothing 92 42.39 0.268 0.156
Leather 117 20.51 0.197 0.063
Wood 97 9.28 0.218 0.153
Paper Products 90 1.11 0.265 0.102
Printing and Publishing 80 3.75 0.464 0.208
Oil Reﬁning 17 0.00 0.245 0.033
Chemicals 178 5.06 0.245 0.083
Rubber and Plastics 169 5.42 0.233 0.098
Non-metal Minerals 201 1.00 0.235 0.076
Metals 121 1.65 0.306 0.084
Metal Products 463 4.32 0.381 0.150
Non-electric Machinery 429 8.16 0.317 0.182
Oﬃce Equip. and Comp. 12 8.33 0.413 0.264
Electric Machinery 129 10.85 0.362 0.157
Electronic Produts. 64 7.81 0.855 0.278
Medical App. and Instr. 58 12.07 0.608 0.375
Vehicles 45 11.11 0.731 0.107
Other Transportation 27 22.22 0.227 0.150
Furniture 205 4.88 0.330 0.122
Note: ICT investment is measured as the ratio of ICT expenditures over turnover, in %
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on ICT investments, by type and application
Firms investing in ICT mean (%)
Number % unconditional | > 0
Total ICT 2,490 77.69 0.31 0.40
Hardware 2,309 72.95 0.14 0.19
Software 2,240 70.77 0.15 0.21
Telecommunications 984 31.09 0.02 0.06
Administrative/Management systems 2,080 64.90 0.12 0.18
Production systems 1,605 50.08 0.12 0.24
Commercial systems 1,033 32.23 0.04 0.11
Internet 915 28.55 0.02 0.07
Other applications 318 9.92 0.01 0.10
Note: Sample size is 3,205 for Total ICT, 3,165 for types, and 3,195 for applications
Table 3: Additional ﬁrm level variables
Mean Std. Dev Median 1st Quart. 3rd Quart.
Age (Years) 27.94 19.44 24 15 36
Size (Employees) 112.21 266.70 49.33 24 102
Obs. Quality (ISO 2002) 0.55 .. .. .. ..
30Table 4: Preliminary Probit Estimates for Oﬀshoring
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)








Hardware Inv. .. .. ..
0.085(0.080)
[0.008] ..



































Industry dummies. Yes (0.00) Yes (0.00) Yes (0.00) Yes (0.00) Yes (0.00)
Regional dummies Yes (0.25) No No No No
Provincial dummies No Yes (0.05) Yes (0.19) Yes (0.19) Yes (0.21)
Log-likelihood −715.86 −678.26 −637.61 −628.62 −627.07
Pseudo R
2 0.148 0.164 0.214 0.213 0.215
Note: Size dummy takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has more than 50 employees.
Standard errors in round brackets and marginal eﬀects in square brackets.
Table 5: BBP, Geographic and Demographic Characteristics
BBP Municipalities Non-BBP Municipalities
Mean Median Mean Median
Inhabitants 31,122 12,192 4,142 3,124
Density (Inhabitants per Kms) 735.49 421.37 306.40 155.79
Latitude (Decimal System) 44.22 45.04 44.43 45.24
Longitude (Decimal System) 11.25 11.02 11.05 10.98
Costal Area (%) 16.51 .. 8.93 ..
Altitude (Meters) 164.17 128 257.02 227
Note: Unweighted statistics based on the 1,596 municipalities where ﬁrm headquarters are located
31Table 6: Non-linear System Estimation (unrestricted model, full sample)
Total ICT Inv Hardware Inv Software/TLC Inv
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
N. of ﬁrms 3,172 3,205 3,133 3,165 3,133 3,165
Dep. Variable Oﬀshoring ICT Inv. Oﬀshoring ICT Inv. Oﬀshoring ICT Inv
Total ICT Inv −0.695(0.138) .. .. .. .. ..
Hardware Inv .. .. −0.975(0.291) .. .. ..
Software/TLC Inv .. .. .. .. −0.669(0.208) ..
Age 0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.000) 0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.001)
Size Dummy 0.575(0.096) 0.135(0.038) 0.638(0.091) 0.057(0.021) 0.667(0.087) 0.124(0.028)
Obs. Quality 0.238(0.070) 0.144(0.040) 0.227(0.080) 0.056(0.021) 0.248(0.081) 0.112(0.029)
Broad Band Prov. .. 0.075(0.049) .. 0.005(0.028) .. 0.078(0.038)
Inhabitants −0.006(0.092) −0.118(0.062) 0.030(0.103) −0.004(0.034) −0.011(0.106) −0.128(0.046)
Density 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000)
Latitude 0.014(0.128) 0.084(0.072) −0.018(0.147) 0.019(0.039) 0.017(0.149) 0.076(0.052)
Longitude 0.071(0.065) −0.021(0.036) 0.093(0.073) −0.005(0019) 0.101(0.073) 0.003(0.026)
Altitude 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000)
Costal Area −0.045(0.137) 0.040(0.074) −0.062(0.157) .. −0.024(0.158) 0.034(0.054)
Constant −4.126(0.663) −3.536(3.19) −3.620(6.526) −0.873(1.723) −5.337(6.594) −3.564(2.332)
ση 0.971(0.014) .. −0.515(0.008) .. 0.690(0.010) ..
ρε,η 0.710(0.123) 0.516(0.138) 0.509(0.134)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood −4,636.69 −2,990.34 −3,624.15
Note: standard errors in brackets.
Table 7: Non-linear System Estimation (restricted model, full sample)
Total ICT Inv Hardware Inv Software/TLC Inv
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
N. of ﬁrms 3172 3205 3133 3165 3133 3165
Dep. Variable Oﬀshoring ICT Inv Oﬀshoring ICT Inv Oﬀshoring ICT Inv
Total ICT Inv −0.710(0.134) .. .. .. .. ..
Hardware Inv .. .. −1.006(0.287) .. .. ..
Software/TLC Inv .. .. .. .. −0.691(0.206) ..
Age 0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.001) 0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.001)
Size Dummy 0.570(0.096) 0.132(0.038) 0.636(0.091) 0.057(0.021) 0.666(0.087) 0.123(0.028)
Obs. Quality 0.240(0.070) 0.144(0.040) 0.228(0.080) 0.057(0.021) 0.251(0.080) 0.112(0.029)
Broad Band Prov. .. 0.079(0.048) .. 0.004(0.028) .. 0.083(0.037)
Inhabitants −0.027(0.086) −0.125(0.061) 0.001(0.098) −0.011(0.034) −0.032(0.100) −0.127(0.045)
Constant −2.472(0.489) −0.200(0.120) −2.983(0.439) −0.099(0.066) −3.146(0.410) −0.299(0.088)
ση 0.971(0.014) .. 0.515(0.008) .. 0.691(0.010) ..
ρε,η 0.722(0.119) 0.530(0.136) 0.522(0.123)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood −4,639.83 −2,993.30 −3,626.78
Note: standard errors in brackets.
32Table 8: Marginal eﬀects for the oﬀshoring equation
Total ICT inv Hardware inv Software/TLC inv
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Total ICT Inv −0.113(0.068) −0.119(0.069) .. .. .. ..
Hardware Inv .. .. −0.110(0.060) −0.116(0.062) .. ..
Software/TLC Inv .. .. .. .. −0.072(0.053) −0.077(0.057)
Size dummy 0.094(0.016) 0.096(0.015) 0.074(0.013) 0.075(0.014) 0.075(0.015) 0.077(0.016)
Inhabitants −0.001(0.022) −0.005(0.021) 0.003(0.011) 0.000(0.011) −0.001(0.011) −0.004(0.011)
Obs. Quality 0.038(0.018) 0.039(0.018) 0.025(0.009) 0.026(0.009) 0.027(0.010) 0.028(0.010)
Age 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000)
Costal area −0.007(0.028) .. −0.007(0.017) .. −0.003(0.017) ..
Altitude 0.000(0.000) .. 0.000(0.000) .. 0.000(0.000) ..
Density 0.000(0.000) .. 0.000(0.000) .. 0.000(0.000) ..
Longitude 0.011(0.013) .. 0.010(0.007) .. 0.011(0.007) ..
Latitude 0.002(0.028) .. −0.002(0.015) .. 0.002(0.014) ..
Note: Standard errors computed by bootstrapping (100 repetitions) in brackets. Columns (i), (iii), and (v) refer to the
probit models of Table 6 whereas columns (ii), (iv), and (vi) refer to those of Table 7
Table 9: Non-linear System Estimation (restricted model, restricted sample)
Hardware inv Software/TLC inv
N. of ﬁrms 2283 2293 2283 2293
Dep. Variable Oﬀshoring ICT Inv Oﬀshoring ICT Inv
Hardware Inv −1.228(0.313) .. .. ..
[−0.217] .. .. ..
Software/TLC Inv .. .. −0.632(0.188) ..
.. .. [−0.105] ..
Age 0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.001)
Size Dummy 0.578(0.094) 0.045(0.022) 0.611(0.091) 0.110(0.036)
Obs. Quality 0.258(0.083) 0.042(0.023) 0.301(0.085) 0.136(0.038)
Broad Band Prov. .. 0.025(0.029) .. 0.107(0.048)
Inhabitants 0.013(0.102) −0.043(0.035) −0.018(0.106) −0.180(0.059)
Constant −1.824(0.628) 0.097(0.160) −2.070(0.606) −0.001(0.253)
ση 0.463(0.008) .. 0.765(0.013) ..
ρε,η 0.575(0.134) 0.529(0.133)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood −2,135.92 −2,970.70
Note: standard errors in round brackets. Marginal eﬀects of ICT investment in square brackets.
33Table 10: Non-linear System Estimation, 3 equations (restricted model, full sample)
Hardware Inv Software/TLC Inv
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
N. of ﬁrms 3133 2309 3165 3133 2309 3165
Dep. Variable Oﬀshoring ICT Inv Probit Hard Oﬀshoring ICT Inv Probit Soft/TLC
Hardware Inv −1.049(0.424) .. .. .. .. ..
[−0.127] .. .. .. .. ..
Software/TLC Inv .. .. .. −0.919(0.201) .. ..
.. .. .. [−0.137] .. ..
Age 0.000(0.002) 0.000(0.001) 0.006(0.001) 0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.001) 0.006(0.001)
Size Dummy 0.621(0.109) 0.004(0.021) 0.257(0.052) 0.608(0.095) 0.041(0.029) 0.326(0.052)
Obs. Quality 0.223(0.079) 0.029(0.022) 0.139(0.054) 0.247(0.073) 0.080(0.031) 0.169(0.054)
Broad Band Prov. .. 0.036(0.029) −0.136(0.073) .. 0.118(0.038) −0.074(0.072)
Inhabitants −0.006(0.097) −0.056(0.035) 0.176(0.086) −0.067(0.093) −0.192(0.048) 0.118(0.085)
Constant −2.871(0.582) 0.270(0.071) −0.209(0.157) −2.739(0.478) 0.068(0.094) −0.092(0.159)




Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood −4,005.34 −4,685.85
Notes: standard errors in brackets. ‡ Constrained to to be equal to the correlation coeﬃcient from a standard
Tobit II model for ICT investments. Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean of the covariates in square brackets.
34Graph 1:Broad Band Provision (BBP) by municipality
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